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V 
TN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. Case Number: 20160371-CA 
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN WELLS 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a conviction for providing alcohol to a minor, a class A 
misdemeanor in the Second District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable,Joseph 
Bean, Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court erred in failing to properly address Mr. Wells' 
motion for new trial and whether counsel ineffectively failed to properly file 
a motion for new trial as directed. 
a. Standard of Review: The district court interpreted the law to require 
review of the motion for new trial on appeal. This was a legal ruling 
which is reviewed for correctness. State lJ. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, 
1 8, 222 P.3d 1198. 
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b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Wells moved the court, the day 
he was sentenced, for new trial. R. 150. 
2. Whether the district court erred or plainly erred in failing to inquire into 
the nature of Mr. Wells' dissatisfaction with counsel. 
a. Standard of Review: Whether a trial court should have inquired 
further into a defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Hall, 2013 UT App 4, ,r 8, 294 P.3d 
632. 
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Wells alerted the court to his 
dissatisfaction, which was sufficient to preserve the issue. R. 150. 
However, the trial court also plainly erred to the extent Mr. Wells 
needed to specifically request an inquiry. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The texts of the relevant Constitutional provisions and statutes are m 
Addendum A and B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Wells was charged by information onJune 1, 2015. R. 5. On February 
19, 2016, the case was tried to a jury, who convicted Mr. Wells on the sole count 
of the information. R. 107, 177-369. The day of sentencing, April 14, 2016, Mr. 
Wells orally moved for a new trial. R. 150. The trial court declined to hear the 
motion. R. 152. On May 3, 2015, Mr. Wells appealed to this court. R. 135-36. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At sentencing, Mr. Wells) counsel indicated that Mr. Wells would "like to 
request a new trial" on the basis "that his Counsel was inadequate." R. 150. 
Counsel told the court he thought the ntle required the motion to be filed "ten 
days from sentencing." R. 150. Counsel told the court he thought the court had to 
follow the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 59, which said that a motion 
for new trial "shall be served not later than ten days after the entry of the 
judgment." R. 150. The court mentioned that a rule amendment would not come 
into effect for three weeks, which would extend the period to twenty-eight days. R. 
150-51. 
Defense counsel responded that Mr. Wells would "be outside of that 
anyway" given that the sentencing date was set outside that period. R. 151. The 
State responded that sentencing should go forward that day and that Mr. Wells 
forfeited his right to file the motion since he did not do so within twenty-eight days 
of the verdict. R. 151. The State argued Mr. Wells' remedy could occur on appeal. 
R. 151. 
The court said that it was "struggling" because Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure gives the period of time from entry of the judgment, but in a criminal 
case, the judgment is not complete unlil sentencing. R. 151. Bul lhc courl 
reconciled its struggle and said that the issue was "going to have to be done under 
the appeal. It's going to have to be a situation of an appeal ... that there was some 
error or inadequacy in your original trial. So sentencing is going to go forward 
3 
today." R. 152. Defense counsel responded, "All right, well, we've made our 
record." R. 15 2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court improperly denied Mr. Wells review of his motion 
for new trial because it misinterpreted the law as requiring him to address new trial 
concerns during the direct appeal. Additionally, defense counsel ineffectively 
misconstrued the rule's requirements and failed to properly raise the motion for 
new trial, both in writing and in a timely fashion. Both counsel and the court's 
failures prevented Mr. Wells from properly asserting his motion for new trial. 
Point IL When Mr. Wells alerted the court to a problem and dissatisfaction 




The trial court erroneously interpreted the 
rules regarding motions for new trial which 
prevented Mr. Wells from properly raising his 
motion and counsel ineffectively failed to 
timely and properly raise the motion 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY USED THE RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE TO FORECLOSE MR. WELLS' ARGUMENT 
The trial court wrongly consulted the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and erroneously construed its legal obligation to 
resolve Mr. Wells' motion for new trial. When the court told Mr. Wells that his 
4 
motion would have to be addressed on direct appeal, it prevented Mr. Wells from 
properly raising the motion. 
The trial court considered Rule 59 of the Ru ks of Civil Procedure in 
resolving the motion for new trial. R. 150-52. That provision, at the time, required 
a motion for new trial to be filed no later than 14 days after the judgment. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 59(b) (2015). 1 However, the court incorrectly reft'!rrt'!d 1.0 1.lu-: Rules nf Civil 
Procedure, when a Rule of Criminal Procedure was already in place. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 81(e) (observing that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply only where no 
Rule of Criminal Procedure governs); State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ,r 10, 63 P.3d 
91. 
At the time Mr. Wells made his motion, Rule 24 of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provided Lhal "[a] motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 
10 days after entry of the sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix 
before expiration of the time for filing a motion for new trial." Utah R. Crim. P. 
24(c) (2014).2 
Mr. Wells' oral motion for new trial wa~ timely since it occurred on the day 
of sentencing and wac, not made later than 10 days after sentencing. The Utah 
Supreme Court has addressed this question in part. In State v. Todd, a defendant 
filed a motion for new trial after oral announcement of the sentence, hut before 
entry of the judgment. State v. Todd, 2006 UT 7, if 2, 128 P.3d 1199. The State 
1 The Rule was amended in May 1, 2016 to 28 days. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(b). 
2 The Rule was amended November 1, 2015 to 14 days. Utah R. Crim. P. 24. 
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argued that Todd's motion was not timely, claiming it had to be filed after the 
judgment entered. Id. at ,r 4. A "premature motion is untimely," the State 
contended. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed with the State and reversed, finding 
that the act of orally imposing sentence was the applicable time for the clock to 
begin running. Critically, the court observed that prematurity was not the issue: 
It is not so important when the ten-day window for filing a motion for 
new trial begins to run, as it is that the defendant, the court, the 
state, and others be abl,e to determine when it begins. 
Id. at ,r 8 (emphasis in original). 
However, in State v. Vess~, this court held that a motion for new trial filed 
after conviction but before sentencing-in Vessey's case two months prior to 
sentencing--was untimely. State v. Vess~, 957 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). To this court, the rule's use of the phrase "after sentencing" meant that 
Vessey's motion was premature. Id. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed Vess~ and 
its rationale, but that was prior to Todd. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ,r,r 6-10. 
This case is different from Vess~, however, for two key reasons. First, Mr. 
Wells made his motion the day that sentence was announced and Todd focuses on 
a defendant's perception of matters as it concerns an early filing. Second, Mr. 
Wells had to rely on the court's erroneous order that it would not consider the 
motion for new trial and that the request had to be dealt with on his direct appeal. 
Mr. Wells has not found Utah authority where a person has orally moved 
for a new trial the day of sentencing, probably because Utah law requires the 
request to be made in writing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24(b). However, Mr. Well's 
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timely alerted the court to the issue since the motion was made concurrently with 
his sentencing proceeding. As Todd made clear, the beginning of the clock makes 
little difference, so long as the defendant would reasonably believe the motion to 
be timely. A defendant would reasonably assume that his motion for new trial, 
filed concurrently with the sentencing proceeding would fit within the rule's limits. 
See Todd, 2006 UT 7, 1 8. 
Numerous courts have entertained motions for new trial made orally during 
sentencing. See e.g., People v. Muro, No. Bl 73620, 2005 WL 1·08018, at *3 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 22, 200!1); Stat,e v. Poland, 116 Idaho 34, 35, 773 P.2d 651, 652 (Ct. App. 
1989); Peopl,e v. Bivens, 163 Ill. App. 3d 472, 401, 516 N . .E.2d 738, 743 (1987); State 
v. McPherson, 630 So. 2d 935, 943 (La. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Tumer, No. 78630, 
2001 WL 1001019, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2001); Com v. English, No. 776 
EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10978693, at *l (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014). 
However, Rule 24 also requires the motion to be made in writing. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 24(b). Mr. Wells made no such request. However, the purpose of the 
motion was to alert the court to the issue, particularly claims of ineffective 
assistance. And since the rule allows the court to extend the filing period-
particularly to obtain affidavits or evidence-Mr. Wells orally sought to raise the 
issue. 
The error lies with the court, not with Mr. Wells. After Mr. '\;Veils made the 
motion, the court referenced the wrong rule, told Mr. Wells that it would not 
consider the issue, and told him he would have to raise the issue on direct appeal. 
7 
R. 152. This was erroneous. Mr. Wells was entitled to rely on the court's 
interpretation of the law and should not be faulted for the court's error. 
B. TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVELY FAILED TO POINT THE 
COURT TO THE CORRECT RULE AND TO TIMELY MOVE FOR 
NEW TRIAL IN WRITING 
Trial counsel also pointed the court to the wrong rule in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. R. 150. He also believed that the Mr. Wells was too late to file his 
motion, since he believed it had to be filed after the verdict. R. 151. These were 
errors of law. Had counsel properly been aware of the applicable rule, he could 
have filed the motion for new trial in writing and within IO days of sentence. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show 
that his counsel's "performance both falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and prejudices his client." Adams, 2005 UT 62, ,r 25, (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on 
appeal presents a question of law. To prove ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show: (1) that counsel's performance was 
objectively deficient and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but 
for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more 
favorable outcome at trial. To satisfy the first part of the test, 
defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial 
counsel rendered adequate assistance. 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT I, ,r 22, 247 P.3d 344 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
Counsel was objectively deficient because he interpreted the wrong rule and 
forfeited his client's claim by not filing it on time or in writing. Counsel have a 
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constitutional obligation to accurately inform defendants of the law. Lafler v. Cooper, 
132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012) (attorney rendered ineffective 
assistance and pr~judiced the defendant when he relied on an incorrect legal rule 
in advising the client); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 
2587, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1986) (counsel's failure to timely file suppression motion 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel). Mr. Wells was prejudiced from 
counsel's error, because had counsel properly filed the motion, both in writing and 
on time, he could have raised his claims to the court and been heard. 
For these reasons, this court should find that the trial court and counsel 
both failed to properly alert Mr. Wells to the reality that he had a remedy at law. 
He could have filed a motion for new trial, but it had to be in writing and within 
ten days of sentence. Instead, both the court and counsel erroneously believed that 
Mr. Wells was out of time to file the motion and needed to address these matters 
on direct appeal. Consequently, this court should reverse and remand for a proper 
hearing on the motion for new trial. 
POINT II 
The trial court erred in failing to inquire into 
Mr. Wells' dissatisfaction with counsel 
Mr. Wells told the court during sentencing that he was dissatisfied with his 
counsel's representation. The court did not ever question Mr. Wells about the 
nature of his dissatisfaction or conduct an adequate inquiry. 
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" [W] hen a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, the trial court 
has an affirmative obligation to investigate." State v. Waterfield, 2014 UT App 67, ,r 
11,322 P.3d 1194, 1198, cert. denied~ 333 P.3d 365 (Utah 2014); State v. Abelon, 2016 
UT App 22, ,r 12. "When a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, a trial 
court 'must make some reasonabk, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the 
defendant's complaints."' State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ,r 27, 984 P.2d 382 (citing 
State v. Pursi.fell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added)). When 
the defendant alleges dissatisfaction with trial counsel, 
the court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to 
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise 
itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's 
relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to 
the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such 
an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be 
violated but for substitution. Even when the trial judge suspects that 
the defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely to 
manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial, perfunctory 
questioning is not sigficient. 
Pursi.fell, 746 P.2d at 273 (emphasis added); State v. Vess~, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). 
Here, the district court did not conduct a Pursifell inquiry which is "per se 
error requiring remand to the trial court to 'determine if the defendant's complaint 
... justified the appointment of substitute counsel."' Waterfield, 2014 UT App 6 7, ,r 
12, quoting Vessry, 967 P.2d at 964. 
The record does not contain the substance of Mr. Wells' complaint. 
However, defense counsel told the court that he wanted a new trial because he 
10 
C>. ~ 
believed his counsel was inadequate. R. 150. Because the trial court failed to 
properly conduct its inquiry, the record fails to contain Mr. Wells' complaints. 
As the United States Supreme Court has held, "a defendant's right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is impaired when he cannot cooperate in an active 
manner with his lawyer . . .. The defendant must be able to provide needed 
information to his lawyer and to participate in the making of decisions on his own 
behal£" Ri,ggi:ns v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992). There may well have been a 
complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict in this case, 
which are all good cause reasons for new counsel. 
Mr. Wells at least brought a general concern to the court's attention. 
Unfortunately, the record does not reflect the nature of the conflict because the 
court failed to make the proper inquiry. In fact, it made no inquiry and summarily 
denied the motion. Therefore, the trial court did not fulfill its duty to "apprise itself 
of the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or 
her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires 
substitution." See Vess~, 967 P.2d at 962 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
If Mr. Wells failed to properly alert the court to its obligation to conduct an 
inquiry, then the court plainly erred. This court may review an unpreserved issue 
for plain error. State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ,r 26, 95 P.3d 1203. "To 
demonstrate plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing (i) an error exists; 
11 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful." Id. at iJ 28. 
As demonstrated supra, the court erred in failing to conduct the proper 
inquiry into Mr. Wells' dissatisfaction \!Vith counsel. Mr. Wells was harmed, 
because had the court conducted the inquiry as required, he would have been 
allowed to present evidence related to his dissatisfaction with counsel and the court 
could have determined that he merited substitute counsel and a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse and remand \!Vith instructions to hear Mr. Wells' 
motion for new trial and to address Mr. Wells' complaints \!Vith his counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 day of October, 2016. 
Isl Samuel P. Newton 
SAMUEL P. NEWTON 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FIFrH AMENDMENT 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crone, unless ou a pn::se11Lc11eul or iu<licuntnl of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defen(s)e. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7. [DUE PROCESS OF LAW.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. (RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify 
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 




Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure 
Utah R. Crim.. P. Rule 24. Motion for New Trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new 
trial in the interest of justice if there is any error o~ impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A mo lion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion 
~hall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of 
the motion. If additional lime is required to procure affidavit~ or evidence the 
court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems 
reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 14 days after entry of the 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before expiration of the 
time for filing a motion for new trial. 
( d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had 
been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence 
or in argument. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 59. New Trial. 
( a) Grounds. Except as limited by Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to any 
party on any issue for any of the following reasons: 
(a)(l) irregularity in the proceedings of the court,jury or opposing party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which a party was prevented from 
having a fair trial; 
(a)(2) misconduct of the jury, which may be proved by the affidavit or declaration 
of any juror; 
(a)(3) accident or surprise that ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; 
(a)(4) newly discovered material evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, 
have been discovered and produced at the trial; 
(a)(5) excessive or inadequate damages that appear to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice; 
(a)(6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision; or 
(a)(7) that the verdict or decision is contrary to law or based on an error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 
days after entry of the judgment. 
When the motion for a new trial is filed under paragraph (a)(l), (2), (3), or (4), it 
must be supported by affidavits or declarations. If a motion for a new trial is 
supported by affidavits or declarations, they must be served with the motion. 
(c) Further action after non-jury trial. After a nonjury trial, the court may, 
on motion for a new trial, open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
ones, and direct entry of a new judgment. 
(d) New trial on initiative of court or for reasons not in the motion. No 
later than 28 days after entry of the judgment the court, on its own, may order a 
new trial for any reason that would justify a new trial on motion of a party. After 
giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court may grant a 
timely motion for a new trial for a reason not stated in the motion. The order 
granting a new trial must state the reasons for the new trial. 
( e) Motion to alter or am.end a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment must ~e filed no later than _28 days after entry of the judgment. 
·~ 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 81. Applicability of the Rules in General. 
( a) Special statutory p1·oceedings. These rules shall apply to all special 
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part of 
the former Code of Civil Procedure; such procedure shall be in accordance with 
these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in 
uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings 
subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of any 
judgment or order entered. 
(c) Application to small claims. These rules shall not apply to small claims 
proceedings except as expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules. 
( d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an adroini!'ttrative 
board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in 
appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an 
administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory procedure 
in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent with 
these rules. 
( e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on April 14, 2016) 
MR. MARSHALL: No. 14, Christopher Wells. 
4 THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Christopher Allen Wells, 
5 case No. 151901182. Time set for sentencing in the matter. 
6 Good afternoon, Mr. Wells. 
7 MR. WELLS: How you doing? 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Marshall, is there any reason why 
9 sentencing should not go forward today? 
10 
11 
MR. MARSHALL: I'm not sure, your Honor. Mr. Wells has 
informed me that he'd like to request a new trial. I guess the 
12 basis for that is the fact that his Counsel was inadequate. I 
13 haven't had a chance to look at the rule, but I think it's ten 
14 days -- or is it ten days from sentencing? 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Wayment? 
16 MR. MARSHALL: It's 50 -- it's 50 --
17 
18 
MR. WAYMENT: I don't know either, Judge. 
MR. MARSHALL: -- is it 59? I think that I believe, 
19 your Honor, this is one of those situations where we follow the 
20 Rules of Civil Procedure, and 59-- Rule 59 would be request for 
21 new -- new trial. "Motion for a new trial shall be served not 
22 later than ten days after the entry of the judgment," 59(b), 
23 likewise a motion to alter or amend. 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Right, the new rule doesn't come into play 








MR. MARSHALL: What's the --
THE COURT: It grants twenty-eight days. 
MR. MARSHALL: Oh, does it? 
'1'111!: CUUH.'1': Uu L j_ L 
MR. MARSHALL: W€ll, we'd be outside of that anyway 
6 with sentencing. That makes more sense, by the way. So other 
7 than that l think there's no legal reason. I think he'll want 
8 to appeal, but that happens after sentencing. 
9 THE COURT: Okay, give me give me just a moment. 
10 Mr. Wayment, do you have any further insight on the status of 
11 what's been asked for? 
12 MR. WAYMENT: Well, Judge, I don't have the rules in 
13 front of me. This is the first that I've heard, but my under-
14 standing is that sentencing should continue. He either has the 
15 opportunity to appeal after, or else he should have ap -- or 
16 he had his time to appeal at the time that he was found guilty 
17 twenty-eight days from that. We're outside of that. It's been 
18 two months. 
19 THE COURT: Here's where I'm struggling right now on 
20 the matter. The language of Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
21 Criminal of Civil Procedure talks about ten days from the 
22 entry of judgment. In a criminal context judgment includes 
23 sentencing. Judgment is not completed until sentencing. 
MR. WAYMENT: Good point. You're right. 24 
25 THE COURT: So I'm not -- I'm trying to figure out how 
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1 to mesh that all together, that language, and I'm struggling 
2 with that just for a moment. If you'll give me just a little 
3 bit more 
4 MR. WAYMENT: Your right, your Honor, because it's 
5 after sentencing that the Court enters its --
6 THE COURT: Judgment. 
7 MR. WAYMENT: Right. 
8 THE COURT: That's the official judgment point. That's 
9 where I'm struggling. So I think it's -- I think it's going to 
10 have to be done under the appeal. It's going to have to be a 
11 situation of an appeal that your orig -- or that there was some 
12 error or inadequacy in your original trial. So sentencing is 






MR. MARSHALL: All right, well, we've made our· record. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. MARSHALL: I don't know what to say, your Honor. 
Thirty days is -- obviously nobody wants to go to jail. I 
think in this case we have a situation where Mr. Wells, quite 
19 frankly, was -- I don't know if he really understood what he 
20 was doing, to be honest, and I know that's not an excuse 
21 exactly; but what I gather from this is and you recall the 
22 young man on the stand, your Honor. He was quite -- quite a 
23 fellow. He was clear that he did not want to drink alcohol, 
24 and from what I can gather, if he did drink alcohol, it was a 
25 very small amount. It was a little bit mixed with something 
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